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A Tale of Two Regulators: Antitrust
Implications of Progressive
Decentralization in Blockchain
Platforms
Evan Miller*
Abstract
Competition regulators have identified the potential for
blockchain technology to disrupt traditional sponsor-led
platforms, like app stores, that have received increased antitrust
scrutiny. Enforcement actions by securities regulators, however,
have forced blockchain-based platforms to adopt a strategy of
progressive
decentralization,
delaying
decentralization
objectives in favor of the centralized model that competition
regulators hope they will disrupt. This regulatory tension, and
the implications for blockchain’s procompetitive potential, have
yet to be explored. This Article first identifies the origin of this
tension and its consequences through a competition law lens, and
then recommends that competition regulators account for this
tension in monitoring the blockchain industry and strive to
resolve it moving forward.
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I.

Introduction

Competition regulators around the world have recognized
the procompetitive potential of permissionless, decentralized
blockchain-based platforms.1 In particular, blockchain
technology has the ability to limit or eliminate the role of the
central intermediary or sponsor in a multi-sided platform,
which competition regulators hope will mitigate the risk of one
company securing market power.2 For example, unlike
traditional platforms where one party controls user data and
platform rules, including platform access, decentralized
blockchain-based platforms typically open network data and
1. See Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Just., Never
Break the Chain: Pursuing Antifragility in Antitrust Enforcement, Remarks
at the Thirteenth Annual Conference on Innovation Economics (Aug. 27,
2020), https://perma.cc/U3TE-267K; CHRIS PIKE, OECD, ISSUES PAPER BY THE
SECRETARIAT NO. 47, BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY AND COMPETITION POLICY 7
(2018), https://perma.cc/5Y5L-EBXM (PDF).
2. See Delrahim, supra note 1 (“The potential of blockchain is the ability
to operate a marketplace or network without a centralized
intermediary. . . . [A] central question for antitrust enforcers [is]: whether this
new way of organizing interactions can prevent or limit the concentration of
market power.”); Christian Catalini & Catherine Tucker, Antitrust and
Costless Verification: An Optimistic and a Pessimistic View of the Implications
of Blockchain Technology (MIT Sloan Sch. Working Paper No. 5523-18, 2018).
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governance to all platform participants.3 Accordingly,
competition regulators consider decentralized platforms as a
potential alternative to sponsor-led platforms that many have
recently challenged for allegedly violating antitrust laws.4
Enforcement actions from other regulators, however, are
pushing blockchain-based platforms away from the ideals of
decentralization and toward the centralized, sponsor-led model
that competition regulators hope they will disrupt. In
particular, enforcement actions against Initial Coin Offerings
(ICOs)—a key mechanism to incentivize participation in an
open and decentralized network—have complicated the
procompetitive vision for blockchain platforms.
This Article begins with a brief primer on blockchain
platforms. It continues by describing the incentives problem
that blockchain platforms face, the role that ICOs play in
solving that problem, and the response from the US Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC). This Article then identifies a
consequence of the SEC’s enforcement actions against ICOs:
that companies must adopt a platform-sponsor role at the outset
and gradually march toward decentralization over time—a
business strategy called progressive decentralization. Next, it
discusses
the
antitrust
implications
of
progressive
decentralization and the ICO enforcement actions that led to it.
This Article concludes with recommendations for regulators and
policymakers.

3. These are just a handful of typical sponsor functions, but they are the
ones that generally result in complaints from platform participants and
competitors, and that as a result drive antitrust scrutiny. Other typical
sponsor roles, such as steering platform development, marketing, and
lobbying for preferred legal treatment, are performed in the blockchain context
by non-profit foundations (e.g., Ethereum Foundation), which are typically
composed of a platform’s founding group of developers, who can influence but
not control a decentralized platform, and industry association groups (e.g., The
Blockchain Association).
4. See, e.g., Complaint for Injunctive & Other Equitable Relief at 3, Fed.
Trade Comm’n v. Facebook, Inc., No. 20-cv-03590 (D.D.C. Dec. 9, 2020)
(accusing Facebook of “anticompetitive conditioning of access to its platform
to suppress competition”).
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II.

Primer on Blockchain Platforms

In general terms, a “blockchain” is a decentralized,
distributed ledger that maintains an immutable record of
transactions. Each transaction or series of transactions is a
block in the chain. Banking offers some clear examples that help
distinguish blockchain networks from traditional networks.
Traditional networks require users to trust that a central
intermediary will accurately confirm and execute valid
transactions. For example, banking customers rely on their
banks for access to their funds, to accurately record and relay
the balance of their account, and to execute valid transactions,
such as the exchange of funds, between parties. In blockchain
networks, however, transaction records are duplicated,
distributed, and verified across a network of individual
computers or “validators,” eliminating the need for trust in a
central intermediary. To use a variation on the banking example
from above, in a blockchain network where two users are trying
to exchange a digital asset, a user does not need to trust that
any one party will confirm ownership of that digital asset and
execute transfer of that ownership from one party to the other.
Instead, the provenance of that digital asset is simultaneously
confirmed by all of the individual computers on the blockchain,
each of which holds a copy of the blockchain’s ledger. Upon the
transaction’s completion, an updated ledger is duplicated and
distributed to the validators on the network. Blockchain
networks often reward validators with digital assets known as
tokens.
A “blockchain-based platform” is a platform built using the
above-described distributed ledger technology upon which
developers can write and host applications. Simplified, a
blockchain-based platform has two layers, the protocol layer and
the application layer. The blockchain protocol establishes the
rules by which the network is governed and transactions are
validated.5 Protocols designed to support applications
incorporate an application programming interface that allows
5. The process for validating transactions, known as a “consensus
mechanism,” varies by protocol. One example is proof-of-stake, where
validators agree to tie-up some of their tokens to vie for a chance to validate a
transaction and mint the next block in the chain, for which they receive a
token reward.
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developers to access and transmit data to and from the
blockchain. Ethereum, for example, allows developers to write
“smart contracts,” a coded script that is embedded into the
Ethereum blockchain and sets out rules for governing a specific
transaction. Developers can then build applications that
interact with these smart contracts.
What makes blockchain platforms unique and potentially
disruptive to existing networks is that a central authority does
not control the rules governing the protocol and its applications.
Smart contracts, for example, are autonomous and
self-executing—their terms cannot be changed, even by the
contract’s creator. Additionally, changes to protocol rules
typically require approval from platform participants—one
party is unable to unilaterally change the rules of the platform,
which is a common criticism of sponsor-led platforms, like app
stores.
III. Blockchain’s Incentives Problem
For all of its procompetitive potential, the concept of a
decentralized, permissionless, and open-source blockchain
protocol faces a significant incentives problem, or what at least
one investor has called a “value capture paradox.”6 Blockchain
networks are multi-sided platforms that need to attract a
diverse set of participants to succeed, including investors,
validators, developers, and end users. A fundamental
characteristic of a decentralized platform is that the network’s
source code, as well as its data, is publicly available. This means
that any developer can create and implement a copy or “fork” of
an open-source protocol. Developers could even take a fee-based
protocol and duplicate it, while reducing the fee or eliminating
it altogether. Put another way, a permissionless, decentralized,
and open-source network is completely undefended from
free-riding. Intellectual property and trade secret protections
(e.g., using resources such as data in a proprietary way) that
typically protect platforms and that allow its participants to
generate income are absent from open and decentralized
blockchain networks. If investors, validators, and developers
6. TechCrunch, Ali Yahya: Crypto Business Models, YOUTUBE (May 27,
2020), https://perma.cc/9MCE-M3AS.
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are less able to capture value, then there is less incentive to
participate in the network.
To solve the incentives problem, blockchain platforms must
implement a mechanism that allows participants to capture
value from the network. Without solving the incentives problem,
it is unlikely that a blockchain platform will achieve the
disruptive competitive potential that regulators often tout.7
A.

ICOs as a Solution to Blockchain’s Incentive Problem

Raising funds through the issuance of digital assets, often
as an ICO, was the blockchain community’s early response to its
incentives problem. ICOs serve a dual purpose. First, they allow
developers to raise capital on the front end of a project by
pre-selling access to their platform in the form of tokens.
According to CoinDesk’s ICO Tracker, ICOs raised $256 million
in 2016, $5.5 billion in 2017, and $13.6 billion in the first half of
2020.8 Second, tokens build strong network effects through a
feedback loop. A blockchain’s token draws the attention of early
investors and developers.9 These early investors and developers
build products and services on the blockchain in an effort to
cause the success of the project and increase the value of their
tokens. The success of the project brings more users to the
blockchain, who share in the value appreciation of the network,
which drives more investors and developers to participate, each
with an aligned incentive to develop and build upon the
blockchain to drive up the value of their tokens. In its most
simple form, the token feedback loop can be described as:
investment leads to development, development leads to user

7. As former Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim explained,
“[t]he benefit of blockchain is that it may be able to eliminate, or shift the role
of, intermediaries. The drawback in the system is that individual participants
might lack the proper incentives to invest in creating the network in the first
instance or in maintaining it over time.” Delrahim, supra note 1.
8. CoinDesk ICO Tracker, COINDESK, https://perma.cc/PUY4-ZKZ7.
9. See Christian Fisch, Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) to Finance New
Ventures, 34 J. BUS. VENTURING 1, 5 (2019) (“ICOs typically occur in the early
stages of a venture’s life cycle and the tokens often do not have any counter
value or real-world usage at the time of the ICO.” (citations omitted)).
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adoption, user adoption leads to value, and value leads to
investment, and over again.10
An ICO does not necessarily guarantee a functioning
feedback loop, however. Instead of attracting active participants
to the platform, ICOs may attract speculators who only intend
to trade the token on crypto exchanges.11 Investors are an
important part of the feedback loop, and asset liquidity an
important part of value capture, but a large imbalance between
speculators and active platform participants (e.g., users,
developers, and validators) risks the integrity of the platform.
B.

Regulatory Response to ICOs

During the 2017 ICO boom12 and the period that followed,
the regulatory landscape was relatively uncertain as the SEC
struggled to provide clarity to blockchain startups regarding
this nascent form of fundraising and platform building.13 Fast

10. See Lin William Cong, Ye Li & Neng Wang, Tokenomics: Dynamic
Adoption and Valuation E-2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No.
27222, 2020) (“[A] greater user base attracts more resources and research onto
the platform, accelerating the technological progress on the platform and
creating a positive feedback loop.”).
11. See Sabrina T. Howell, Marina Niessner & David Yermack, Initial
Coin Offerings: Financing Growth with Cryptocurrency Token Sales 21 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 24774, 2019) (“[C]onventional
institutional investors such as hedge funds and VCs have purchased
significant shares of tokens, especially in the most sought-after ICOs, raising
concerns that utility tokens are held mostly be speculators rather than future
customers.”).
12. See Nareg Essaghoolian, Comment, Initial Coin Offerings: Emerging
Technology’s Fundraising Innovation, 66 UCLA L. REV. 294, 312–13 (2019)
(“[I]t was not until 2016 that ICOs boomed in popularity. . . . In 2017, there
was an exponential increase in the number of ICOs held and the amounts
raised.”).
13. In July 2017, the SEC published an investigative report concluding
that DAO Tokens were securities and cautioned market participants that:
[T]he federal securities laws apply to those who offer and sell
securities in the United States, regardless whether the issuing
entity is a traditional company or a decentralized autonomous
organization, regardless whether those securities are purchased
using U.S. dollars or virtual currencies, and regardless whether
they are distributed in certificated form or through distributed
ledger technology.
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forward to 2020 and the SEC Enforcement Division’s record
year in disgorgements and penalties totaling $4.68 billion, more
than a quarter of which came from unregistered ICOs.14 During
this time, the SEC relied on enforcement actions over
rulemaking to regulate blockchain-based platforms.15 These
enforcement actions are driving blockchain-based companies in
the United States16 to adopt a more traditional fundraising
model, and to ease into decentralization.
The SEC published a “Framework for ‘Investment Contract’
Analysis of Digital Assets” in April 201917 that used the Howey
Test, derived from SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.,18 to determine
whether a specific token or coin constitutes an “investment
contract” that is subject to securities regulations. The first prong
of the Howey Test is “the investment of money,”19 which the SEC
explains is “typically satisfied in an offer and sale of a digital
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Issues Investigative Report
Concluding DAO Tokens, a Digital Asset, Were Securities (July 25, 2017),
https://perma.cc/QJ95-7DAK. The SEC made clear that the DAO Report was
intended to put the industry on notice, but acknowledged that whether a
digital asset was a security would depend on an individualized assessment of
“particular facts and circumstances.” Report of Investigation Pursuant to
Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO, Exchange Act
Release No. 81207, 2017 SEC LEXIS 2194 (July 25, 2017), https://perma.cc
/3WC4-HTMY (PDF).
14. Joshua Mapperson, The SEC Collected $1.26 Billion from
Unregistered ICOs in 2020, COINTELEGRAPH (Nov. 12, 2020), https://perma.cc
/E47B-R65V.
15. See Marco Dell-Erba, From Inactivity to Full Enforcement: The
Implementation of the “Do No Harm” Approach in Initial Coin Offerings, 26
MICH. TECH. L. REV. 175, 194–203 (2020) (discussing the transition from
relative inaction on the part of the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission to a state of full enforcement of existing, rather than new,
securities laws as they apply to ICOs).
16. Although this Article focuses on the regulatory treatment of ICOs in
the United States, blockchain-based startups may face similar issues in
countries with comparable securities laws. For an overview of ICO regulatory
treatment in foreign jurisdictions, see L. BUS. RSCH., GETTING THE DEAL
THROUGH: FINTECH (Penny Miller & Angus McLean eds., 2018), LEXIS
(database updated 2021).
17. STRATEGIC HUB FOR INNOVATION AND FIN. TECH., U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, FRAMEWORK FOR “INVESTMENT CONTRACT” ANALYSIS OF DIGITAL
ASSETS (2019) [hereinafter FRAMEWORK FOR DIGITAL ASSETS], https://perma.cc
/98Q5-65F6.
18. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
19. Id. at 301.
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asset because the digital asset is purchased or otherwise
acquired in exchange for value, whether in the form of real (or
fiat) currency, another digital asset, or other type of
consideration.”20 The second prong is “common enterprise,”21
which the SEC also typically finds that digital assets satisfy
because “the fortunes of digital asset purchasers have been
linked to each other or to the success of the promoter’s efforts.”22
The third prong of the Howey Test is “reasonable expectation of
profits to be derived from the . . . efforts of others,”23 which the
SEC identifies as usually “the main issue in analyzing a digital
asset . . . .”24 The SEC further explains that “[w]hen a promoter,
sponsor, or other third party . . . provides essential managerial
efforts that affect the success of the enterprise, and investors
reasonably expect to derive profit from those efforts, then [the
third prong] is met.”25
The SEC’s concern is that if an investment is dependent on
a third party, information about that third party is necessary to
make an informed investment decision, and without a
regulatory framework that requires disclosure of that
information, uninformed investors are at risk. In the context of
digital assets, this inquiry boils down to whether the platform
is decentralized. For example, the SEC in 2018 clarified that
Bitcoin and Ether—the token that powers the Ethereum
network—are not securities because the underlying networks
are sufficiently decentralized such that investors are not reliant
on any one third party. The SEC has not explained at what point
Bitcoin and Ethereum reached sufficient decentralization, and
if early investments in Ethereum prior to such sufficient
decentralization could be construed as securities.
The SEC and the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Antitrust
Division entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
in June 2020 “to foster cooperation and communication between
the agencies with the aim of enhancing competition in the
20. FRAMEWORK FOR DIGITAL ASSETS, supra note 17.
21. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. at 298–301.
22. FRAMEWORK FOR DIGITAL ASSETS, supra note 17 (citing Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n v. Int’l Loan Network, Inc., 968 F.2d 1304, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
23. United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975).
24. FRAMEWORK FOR DIGITAL ASSETS, supra note 17.
25. Id.
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securities industry.”26 Despite this working relationship, the
SEC’s legal framework for cryptocurrencies puts the cart before
the horse from a go-to-market perspective, which has
implications for competition law priorities. How can a network
reach sufficient decentralization without incentivizing third
parties to develop, maintain and innovate on that network with
tokens? SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce echoed this concern,
asking “[h]ow can a token network ever get off the ground if
every token distribution event is viewed as a securities
offering?”27
IV. Antitrust Implications of Progressive Decentralization as
Response to ICO Enforcement
The SEC’s enforcement actions against ICOs have steered
blockchain-based startups away from ICOs and toward a
business strategy based on “progressive decentralization.”28
Progressive decentralization is a go-to-market strategy that
frontloads product and community development before
decentralization objectives.29 Generally, the progressive
decentralization roadmap is divided into three sequential
stages. First, a core team of developers design an attractive

26. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Securities and Exchange
Commission and Justice Department’s Antitrust Division Sign Historic
Memorandum of Understanding (June 22, 2020), https://perma.cc/NE8EDN9Q.
27. Hester M. Peirce, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Not Braking
and Breaking, Remarks Before the Blockchain Week Event (July 21, 2020),
https://perma.cc/L4D2-5X38.
28. See Jesse Walden, Progressive Decentralization: A Playbook for
Building Crypto Applications, ANDREESSEN HOROWITZ (Jan. 9, 2020), https://
perma.cc/MG95-5QN3 (describing progressive decentralization as “a process
in which founding teams relinquish control by degrees, over
time. . . . allow[ing] teams to focus and create a path toward regulatory
compliance, including issuing tokens that hopefully will not run afoul of
securities regulations”).
29. See id. (“If you’re a crypto founder and are ready for
[decentralization], that means you have achieved early product/market fit,
built a robust community capable of successfully maintaining the application,
and mapped out a model that properly incentivizes sustainable operations.”).
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product or service.30 Second, that core team begins to build a
community of developers and users for that product or service
(i.e., building network effects).31 Third, and finally, the core
team gives ownership of the product or service to the
community, typically through a token distribution that, among
other things, enables holders to participate in platform
governance.32
The deal structure for startups embracing progressive
decentralization is similar to that of traditional startups.
Instead of crowdfunding through an ICO, startups pursue seed
funding from venture capital in exchange for equity in the
company and a right to receive a share of tokens proportionate
to its initial investment if a distribution event occurs.33 When it
comes time to transfer ownership to the community, a
percentage of tokens is allocated to investors on a pro rata basis
relative to the total tokens allocated to the founders, with both
shares diluted, potentially significantly so, to accommodate
distribution to the public.34 This deal structure is a testament to
the value created by a token feedback loop. Investors in
traditional startups accept dilution of their equity share during
subsequent rounds of investments because, in theory, an influx
of capital leads to increased production and a higher rate of
return. Similarly, investors accept dilution of their ownership in
30. See id. (“The earliest stage of building a crypto application requires
all the ingredients of a normal startup: a great team, lean development, tight
execution, and quick learning. During this phase, the only thing that matters
is product/market fit.”).
31. See id. (“[F]ounders might invest more heavily in best practices for
running the product like an open source project: invest in good documentation;
develop openly; offer bounties, grants or other incentives for third-party
development; hire community leaders to help steward open development; and
introduce rough consensus on decision making.” (citation omitted)).
32. See id. (“The spirit of this objective is to mark a specific moment
where a crypto product company completes its journey from traditional
product team to sustainable community-owned-and-operated network.”).
33. Jamie Goldstein, Token Equity Convertible (TEC)—a New Way to
Invest in Crypto Companies, PILLAR VC (Dec. 4, 2017), https://perma.cc/B6JKB5UT.
34. For example, if a venture capital firm invests $1 million for 20 percent
equity in the company and a distribution event occurs in which 70 percent of
all tokens are distributed to the public, then the venture capital firm would
receive 20 percent of the remaining tokens (6 percent), leaving 24 percent for
the founders.
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a blockchain startup through token distribution because of the
increased value that the token feedback loop creates.
Progressive decentralization offers certain strategic
benefits that may be missing from an ICO-first approach.
Progressive decentralization solves for one of the major
inefficiencies associated with an ICO: that, as described above,
a substantial portion of ICO purchasers may be speculators that
are unlikely to actively participate in the development of a
platform. It also prevents companies from launching a product
too early, before the core team develops the right product fit that
will spur adoption of the technology, one of the biggest hurdles
of general consumer use cases for blockchain. As venture
capitalist Nick Grossman explained during a DOJ workshop on
“Venture Capital and Antitrust,” “in the crypto land, you’ve got
things that are public and they’re like seed stage products.”35
From a regulatory-risk perspective, it provides an opportunity
to try to reach sufficient decentralization prior to issuing a
digital asset, mitigating the risk that a token or coin issuance
will run afoul of securities laws.
With that said, progressive decentralization does swing the
pendulum back toward sponsor-led platforms (at least at the
outset) and requires trust that the platform sponsor will, in fact,
follow through on its commitments to decentralize. Additionally,
the regulatory pitfalls facing ICOs still exist as companies try to
execute the third and final stage of a progressive
decentralization roadmap: giving ownership to the community.
This Part unpacks the antitrust implications of progressive
decentralization.
A.

Libra and Early Reactions to Progressive Decentralization

Reactions to Libra, a blockchain-based global payments
system conceived by Facebook and which endorsed progressive
decentralization principles since its inception, provide some
insight into how competition regulators may respond to this
model. Libra adopted a centralized model early to address
technical and regulatory concerns surrounding a fully
35. Nick Grossman, Partner, Union Square Ventures, Remarks at
Venture Capital and Antitrust, Public Workshop Held by the Antitrust
Division of the United States Department of Justice 74 (Feb. 12, 2020)
(transcript available at https://perma.cc/3ERM-BN3J (PDF)).
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The
Libra
permissionless
payments
network.36
Association—made up of Facebook and a set group of other
companies, including Visa, Mastercard, eBay, Uber, Lyft, and
Spotify37—would manage Libra and vote on policy decisions.
Importantly, the users holding Libra would have no say in
governance. Although the Libra blockchain is intended to work
independently of Facebook, many suspected that given the
important role that Libra’s integration with Facebook’s existing
services will play in driving its adoption,38 Facebook had
significant influence over the other association members.39
Right away, this model drew criticism from industry
observers.40 Ethereum Co-Founder Joe Lubin called Libra “a
centralized wolf in a decentralized sheep’s clothing.”41
Competition regulators also reacted with skepticism, honing in
on the ability of the Libra Association’s large, incumbent firms
to exclude competitors. For example, the European Commission
(EC) started investigating “potential anti-competitive behavior”
related to the Libra Association just two months after its launch
due to reported concerns that “the proposed payment system

36. See infra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.
37. Visa, Mastercard, and eBay, among others, left the Libra Association
following regulatory scrutiny of the project. Corinne Reichert & Andrew
Morse, Facebook’s Libra Cryptocurrency Loses Support of Five Founding
Members, CNET (Oct. 14, 2020, 1:30 PM), https://perma.cc/Z7G5-2DGV.
38. Enrique Dans, Libra: An Interesting Idea, If Only Facebook Weren’t
Involved, FORBES (June 20, 2019, 3:44 AM), https://perma.cc/2UFA-2WRX
(“[W]hen the currency comes into circulation, the vast majority of its users will
likely come from the user base of Facebook itself, along with Facebook
Messenger and WhatsApp, which will integrate Calibra and allow Facebook
to monetize the flotation of those funds.”).
39. Clare Duffy, Facebook Says Libra Is Out of Its Control. But Libra’s
Overseers Are a Web of Silicon Valley Insiders, CNN (Sept. 29, 2019, 5:41 PM),
https://perma.cc/MH4S-U9X8.
40. Rony Roy, Is Libra Decentralized? Maybe Not, COINBEAT (July 31,
2019), https://perma.cc/YT4P-4UPX
Once again this is a monopoly of the wealthy where the technology
that was supposed to free us from the system ends up giving control
to a bunch of corporations that are hiding behind the mask of
decentralization but is, in fact, more centralized than what we can
think of.
41. Joe Lubin, Facebook’s Cryptocurrency Is a Centralized Wolf in
Decentralized Sheep’s Clothing, QUARTZ (June 21, 2019), https://perma.cc
/J9GL-RE2W.
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would unfairly shut out rivals.”42 Specifically, the EC said that
it was concerned about how the Libra Association may create
“possible competition restrictions” on the information that will
be exchanged on the Libra blockchain and the use of Libra
consumer data.43
The original Libra white paper explained that “an
important objective of the Libra Association is to move toward
increasing decentralization over time,” promising to start the
transition toward “permissionless governance and consensus on
the Libra network” within five years of Libra’s public launch.44
The lack of detail in Libra’s decentralization roadmap did little
to instill confidence. Thibault Schrepel, a blockchain antitrust
scholar, raised concerns that Libra’s commitment to move to a
permissionless platform was vague and may never come to
fruition.45 Schrepel noted that the Libra white paper made clear
that decentralization was dependent on the development of a
“proven solution that can deliver the scale, stability, and
security needed to support billions of people and transactions
across the globe through a permissionless network,” which may
never occur.46 It also gave the Libra Association a great deal of
discretion over whether any technological solution is sufficient
for Libra’s purposes. The only public-facing and objective
criteria for decentralization was the outside time limit of five
years from the date of public launch to start to decentralize. As
Lubin explains, Facebook and the rest of the Libra Association
“requires our trust that Libra will eventually transition to a
more ‘permissionless,’ decentralized system, whereby anyone
can validate the network, rather than the restrictive member
evaluation criteria keeping control in the hands of the initial 28

42. Lydia Beyoud & Aoife White, Facebook’s Libra Currency Gets
European Union Antitrust Scrutiny, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 20, 2019, 12:41 PM),
https://perma.cc/W22P-D735.
43. Id.
44. LIBRA ASS’N MEMBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO LIBRA 9 (2019)
[hereinafter Libra White Paper], https://perma.cc/WJ84-K8DY (PDF).
45. See Thibault Schrepel, Libra: A Concentrate of “Blockchain
Antitrust”, 118 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 160, 163 (2020) (“[T]he change in
governance may never come. One may wonder if such a vague strategy is best
for Facebook, considering the distrust surrounding the company.”).
46. Libra White Paper, supra note 44, at 4; see Schrepel, supra note 45,
at 162–63.
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firms.”47 Lubin’s comments highlight the dichotomy between
Libra and the trustless architecture that is typical of blockchain
networks.
Employees of Novi, a Facebook subsidiary and Libra
Association member charged with building a Libra-based wallet
with WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger integrations, outlined
the “questions, decisions, and challenges the Libra Association
will face on the journey to permissionless governance and
consensus.”48 They acknowledge that “centralized control” and
the ability of platform architects (like Facebook) to “change the
rules of protocol to their advantage after others have joined” is
an area of concern.49 The Libra Association addresses this
concern, they argue, because it is “an independent, not-for-profit
entity that no single Founding Member can control,” requiring
participation by a majority of Libra Association members to
make any decision.50
Novi employees say that Libra made “irreversible
commitments” to achieve the progressive opening of
participation in the Libra network, including establishing
certain criteria for membership decisions as the Libra
Association expands.51
As the technology matures, the Libra Blockchain will
transition from relying on the votes based on association
membership—in order to operate validator nodes and vote
on governance—to relying on ownership of Libra coins. The
basic intuition is that at scale the network should be owned
by its users and should always evolve in a way to protect
their interests and assets.52

This Article’s focus is on the impact that securities
enforcement actions have had on the procompetitive potential of
blockchain platforms through a competition law lens, but other
regulatory actions have consequences as well. Questions from
financial regulators forced Libra, which is now called “Diem,” to

47.
48.

Lubin, supra note 41.
SHEHAR BANO ET AL., CALIBRA, MOVING TOWARD PERMISSIONLESS
CONSENSUS 1 (2019), https://perma.cc/3V2Y-RADZ (PDF).
49. Id. at 2.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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abandon its plan to progressively decentralize to a
permissionless network altogether.53 Specifically, financial
regulators questioned how Libra could preserve compliance
measures to prevent misuse (e.g., money laundering) after it
transitioned to a permissionless system.54 Instead, Diem
pledged to “replicate the key economic properties of a
permissionless system through an open, transparent, and
competitive market for network services and governance . . . .”55
B.

Progressive Decentralization Requires Trust That Platform
Sponsors Will Actually Decentralize

Decentralization is the linchpin of the procompetitive
potential for blockchain-based platforms, as envisioned by
competition regulators. Indeed, Nick Grossman captured the
sentiment of many competition regulators when he explained
that people are worried about sponsor-led platforms like app
stores where they could be “cut off,” which is why his venture
capital firm is “so excited about the crypto and blockchain space
because that is one area where the platform is an open,
unowned, uncontrolled platform.”56 From Libra’s example, it is
clear that an unspecified path to decentralization is insufficient
to quell the concerns that industry observers and regulators
share regarding sponsor-led platforms in the blockchain space.
Interestingly, there are a handful of mechanisms (some unique
to blockchain) that may help companies address concerns
regarding their commitment to decentralization.
Arthur Camara, one of the founders of CryptoKitties, a
blockchain-based game, describes a scenario in which a game is
run on a smart contract that implements ascending levels of

53. White Paper v2.0, DIEM (2020) [hereinafter Diem White Paper],
https://perma.cc/9CTM-WR5U.
54. See Tom Wilson, Global Money-Laundering Watchdog Closely
Monitoring Facebook’s Libra, Official Says, REUTERS (Sept. 10, 2019, 3:05 PM)
(“[T]he volume and speed of cryptocurrency transactions presents a growing
challenge in pinpointing illegal use, even as technology to identify such actions
is developed.”).
55. Diem White Paper, supra note 53.
56. Grossman, supra note 35, at 66–67.
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decentralization.57 The first level allows the contract owners to
modify gameplay, the second level revokes their ability to
modify gameplay but preserves certain other special privileges,
and the third level revokes all special privileges assigned to the
original contract owner.58 This means that the game would be
fully autonomous, self-executing based on the smart contract’s
terms without external influence from any party, including the
creators.59 Camara suggests that creators can hold themselves
accountable to their progressive decentralization roadmap by
implementing time- or block-based maturity, where the smart
contract described above ascends levels after a predefined
period of time, or at the point that the blockchain passes a
certain block number.60 Founders can also create an economic
incentive to decentralize, where the portion of the fee for using
the service that the founders retain, or the fee itself, increases
with each level of decentralization.61 Competition regulators
appear open to using smart contracts to effectuate behavioral
remedies in competition cases, so implementing progressive
decentralization through smart contracts might be compelling.62
Companies can take other steps to instill confidence within
their community that they will follow through on
decentralization. For example, blockchain-based startup
Compound eliminated the ability for its creators to make sudden
57. Arthur Camara, Dieter Shirley & Grady Mitchell, Why Progressive
Decentralization Is Blockchain’s Best Hope, FREECODECAMP (Feb. 6, 2019),
https://perma.cc/A8TY-K6BZ.
58. Id.
59. Id. (“[P]rogressive decentralization advocates easing into
decentralization in stages rather than diving in headfirst. What that looks like
is building mechanisms into smart contracts that confer special powers to the
creators up front, then incrementally lock those powers away in a transparent
and systematic way.”).
60. Id. (“Lock certain configuration values, revoke the owner’s
capabilities or move to the next level of maturity past a certain time or block
number. Once that point is reached, the contract automatically changes.”).
61. Id. (“Perhaps the fee rises with each level the developer ascends,
locking in at the maximum fee when they reach full decentralization. Or,
alternatively, perhaps they make no money at all until full decentralization is
in place. This financial reward motivates the developer to reach
decentralization at a reasonable pace.”).
62. See PIKE, supra note 1, at 9 (“Depending on the nature of the
commitments, [smart contracts] might remove the often-significant ongoing
monitoring costs for authorities.”).
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changes to the platform’s rules, implementing a 48-hour waiting
period or “time lock” before changes take effect.63 Compound, a
proponent of progressive decentralization, plans to test, in a
transparent way, on-chain governance mechanisms that allow
the community, instead of the core team, to govern the
platform.64
There is not one right way to implement a progressive
decentralization strategy, and only time will tell how embracing
a clear roadmap to community ownership and taking consistent
action in line with that goal—such as publishing high-quality,
open-source developer materials—may reduce the risk of
antitrust scrutiny associated with sponsor-led platforms.
C.

The Current Enforcement Environment May Deter
Leveraging Existing Ecosystems

Even for companies that forgo ICOs at the product
development stage, issuing a token is an integral part of
reaching
the
final
stage
of
progressive
decentralization—community ownership—and companies must
still consider whether that token constitutes a security. As
explained in greater detail above, the third prong of the Howey
Test focuses on investors’ expectations that they will derive
profit based on the work of others.65 The SEC’s application of
this prong to date complicates the path for blockchain-based
platforms that wish to leverage existing ecosystems to spur
adoption. In particular, the SEC brought two of its
highest-profile ICO enforcement actions against messaging app
providers, and a significant factor in each case was the
“inextricable” connection between the token and the platform
sponsor’s messaging app.
In SEC v. Telegram Group, Inc.,66 the SEC argued that
Grams, the token at issue, satisfied the second and third prongs
of the Howey Test because “investors expect[ed] to profit from

63. TechCrunch, Robert Leshner and Jesse Walden: Deep Dive on
Decentralization, YOUTUBE (June 10, 2020), https://perma.cc/SQ35-KDWS.
64. Id.
65. See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text.
66. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Telegram Grp. Inc., No. 19-CV-9439, 2020
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106592 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2020).
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Telegram’s work,” in part due to “integration with Messenger.”67
The SEC explained that “Telegram emphasized to
investors . . . that Messenger . . . w[as] integral to the success of
the TON blockchain and Grams,”68 including in its initial
offering documents, which stated that “[i]ntegrated into
Telegram’s applications, the TON Wallet should become the
world’s most adopted cryptocurrency wallet.”69 Telegram
indicated that it would “leverage its existing ecosystem of
communities, developers, publishers, payment providers, and
merchants to drive demand and value for [Grams]”70 and that
based on the “number of existing Messenger users, Grams would
be accessible in 170 million wallets,” more than Bitcoin and
Ethereum, the two largest cryptocurrencies by market
capitalization.71 Telegram also planned to “airdrop” 250 million
Grams to Messenger users following the launch of the TON
blockchain.72
In SEC v. Kik Interactive Inc.,73 the SEC argued that “Kik
promised to start by integrating Kin into Kik Messenger ‘to
really give it value.’”74 Kik’s CEO purportedly explained at a
2017 conference that “we’re setting 30 percent of Kin aside for
Kik, as a financial incentive for us basically to put this huge
messenger into this ecosystem, and to get this whole ecosystem
going.”75 Kik’s white paper stated that Kik would “leverage its
large existing user base to drive mass adoption” of Kin, and that
“Kik will build fundamental value for the new currency by
integrating Kin into its chat app.”76 Kik explained that it would
67. Complaint at 2, Telegram Group, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106592 (No.
19-CV-9439) [hereinafter Telegram Complaint], https://perma.cc/5WS7-9ZKS
(PDF).
68. Id. at 15.
69. Id. at 17.
70. TELEGRAM OPEN NETWORK (TON), ICO WHITEPAPER 5, https://
perma.cc/T4FX-PZTN; Telegram Complaint, supra note 67, at 23.
71. Id. at 21.
72. Id. at 27.
73. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Kik Interactive Inc., No. 19-cv-5244, 2020
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181087 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2020).
74. Complaint at 16, Kik Interactive, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181087 (No.
19-cv-5244) [hereinafter Kik Complaint], https://perma.cc/8QER-SSZA (PDF).
75. Id. at 30.
76. Id. at 34.

406

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 387 (2021)

integrate digital wallets for each Kik Messenger account to
enable “common wallet interactions,” and would explore
changes to Kik that would support Kik users buying and selling
goods using Kin.77
It is unclear at what point—if at all—a decentralized
network leveraging an existing sponsor-led ecosystem or service
can safely issue a token without violating securities laws. This
is problematic for blockchain advocates who believe that
integration with existing products is the only way to achieve
mass adoption in the near future and for competition regulators,
because adoption is the only way for these platforms to compete.
In addition to securities laws, companies must consider
whether a business strategy to leverage an existing ecosystem
gives rise to antitrust claims on abuse of dominance grounds.
There has been a recent uptick in dominance investigations into
messaging services integrating digital payment services.78
Competition regulators may raise similar concerns about the
integration of token economies and wallets with messaging
platforms or other services.
D.

Progressive Decentralization May Lead to Consolidation

Competition regulators pay close attention to incumbent
firms eliminating competitive threats through acquisition, and
that is especially true for new and potentially disruptive
technologies.79 Facing public scrutiny for allowing digital
platforms to acquire nascent competitors, competition
regulators are likely to be especially protective of blockchain as
an innovative and potentially disruptive technology. Securities
77. Id.
78. Antitrust regulators in India and Brazil investigated, but ultimately
did not take action against Facebook’s launch of WhatsApp Pay. See India
Watchdog Throws Out Antitrust Complaint against WhatsApp, REUTERS (Aug.
19, 2020, 5:29 AM), https://perma.cc/U3WK-CB52; Carolina Mandl, Brazil
Antitrust Agency Revokes Decision Blocking WhatsApp, Cielo Venture,
REUTERS (June 30, 2020, 5:57 PM), https://perma.cc/YM4H-7JLK. Facebook
also intends to leverage its Messenger and WhatsApp services to drive Diem’s
adoption.
79. Then-head of the DOJ’s Antitrust Division, former Assistant Attorney
General Makan Delrhaim stated that “[w]e cannot fall behind and learn, only
too late, that entrenched monopolists have taken anticompetitive actions to
eliminate the threat from blockchain technology to their business models.”
Delrahim, supra note 1.
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enforcement actions that have steered companies toward
progressive decentralization may have made that mission more
difficult. Progressive decentralization increases the likelihood
that a new blockchain startup—or an existing company that is
integrating blockchain in an attempt to differentiate its product
or platform from competitors—will be strategically acquired by
an incumbent firm because it attracts private investors that
may prefer an M&A exit strategy over an ICO. As venture
capital firm Kesha Ventures explains, after the increase in
regulatory enforcement against ICOs, “[m]any new blockchain
focused companies . . . are choosing to stay private for much
longer . . . or ICO/list only in a much later stage, maintaining
M&A as a viable exit option.”80 For companies that may not be
able to secure private investment in the first place, and for
which legally conducting an ICO is too difficult, they may have
to leave the market altogether. This reduces competition.
Kik, for example, turned to an ICO after it was unable to
find a buyer for the business. According to the SEC’s complaint,
Kik hired an investment bank to orchestrate a sale process.
Seven buyers expressed interest in Kik but ultimately declined
to buy the company.81 Kik’s CEO stated that engaging in an ICO
was a necessity because “[Kik] cannot compete with
Facebook.”82 In response to the SEC’s complaint, Kik explained
that its costs exceeded revenues “as a result of struggling to
compete with larger social media companies, who have a
dominant share of the market for advertising within mobile
applications.”83 Kik ultimately shut down its messaging app
during the pendency of the SEC litigation in an effort to divert
resources to its legal defense.84

80. Michael Nov, The Potential of Crypto M&A, KESHA VENTURES (May 8,
2018), https://perma.cc/T8YQ-29U6.
81. Kik Complaint, supra note 74, at 10.
82. Id. at 30.
83. Answer to Complaint at 7, Kik Interactive, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
181087 (No. 19-cv-5244) (citation omitted).
84. Ted Livingston, Moving Forward Boldly with Kin, TED LIVINGSTON
(Sept. 23, 2019), https://perma.cc/23GN-4BAQ.
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V.

Recommendations

Blockchain technology and its use cases are still developing,
and so too is the regulatory response to blockchain-based
platforms. This Article proposes two recommendations for
consideration in light of the apparent tension between the
priorities for securities regulators on the one hand and
competition regulators on the other.
First, competition regulators should consider the current
regulatory dynamics that are shaping the blockchain market
when considering whether to investigate conduct or initiate an
enforcement action. For example, competition regulators should
realize that the current regulatory environment may force a
company to delay decentralization and instead adopt a
sponsor-led model. This could take a handful of forms, including
an association of companies that control the platform in its early
days. Competition regulators should carefully consider a
project’s progressive decentralization roadmap, and the
mechanisms in place to ensure decentralization is achieved,
before reacting negatively to the involvement of an incumbent
firm in a blockchain project or other sponsor-led platform
dynamics. Additionally, competition regulators should
thoughtfully consider whether leveraging an existing ecosystem
(e.g., a messaging app) will actually lead to de facto control over
the blockchain platform, or if such product integration is merely
one step in the progressive decentralization roadmap.
Integrating blockchain technology with an existing product or
service is one of the most likely ways to achieve mass adoption
of blockchain at an early stage and to more quickly realize its
procompetitive benefits.
Second, regulators and policymakers should strive to
resolve the tension that exists between the actions of securities
and competition regulators. To date, the SEC has largely
regulated the blockchain and cryptocurrency community
through enforcement actions. An alternative approach is to
implement rules and guidelines that take into account feedback
from stakeholders. The clarity of rules over fact-specific
enforcement actions would bring a degree of certainty that is
currently missing from the market. Additionally, the SEC and
the DOJ can use their MOU as a framework to better align their
objectives as it relates to the future of blockchain platforms.
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Lastly, policymakers should seek to clarify laws and regulatory
mandates that give rise to the tension in the first place.
VI. Conclusion
SEC enforcement actions are in tension with competition
regulators’ procompetitive vision for blockchain-based
platforms. These actions make it more difficult to solve the
incentives problem that blockchain platforms face and steer
companies toward a sponsor-led model via progressive
decentralization, which competition regulators have challenged
with increasing regularity. In addition to impeding the
realization of decentralization objectives, the SEC’s
enforcement actions complicate the use of existing ecosystems
to spur adoption of blockchain technology that could otherwise
increase competition. They also increase the likelihood that
young blockchain companies may be acquired by firms
incumbent to the industry that they intend to disrupt, which
could reduce competition. Considering the consequences that
SEC enforcement actions are having on the competitive
dynamics of blockchain companies, regulators should carefully
review how enforcement actions may affect blockchain
companies, and how to resolve this tension moving forward.

